Freedom and Equality Dichotomy as a Determining Postulate of Law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32782/2409-4544/2020-1/3Keywords:
law, equality, freedom, justice, societyAbstract
The article examines the categories of freedom and equality, their commonalities and differences, the relationship and interaction. The relationship between freedom and equality, given their functional contradictions, is a principal issue in the context of the fundamental values of social coexistence, in general, and law, in particular. It is emphasized that freedom is, first and foremost, a right to inequality since equality always contravenes freedom. In the dichotomy of freedom and equality, the third element of the ‘construction of law’, justice, plays a principal role in society. The legal justice ultimately means observance of the general balance, the equivalence of mutual rights and obligations, by which the subjects of law are connected with each other. Thus, freedom, equality, and justice form, as if the three vertices of the triangle that underlies the social institution of law. And none of them can be violated or restricted without detriment to the other two. The freedom of each individual ends where the freedom of the other begins. Thus, the application of the principle of equality is inevitable: freedom must be equal for all or it will not be at all. Therefore, the law is a measure of individual freedom, it indicates its scope, limits, beyond which violates the freedom of another, and, consequently, undermines the rule of law. Freedom, and equality, and justice are rooted, inscribed in the very social reality, and have a purely objective meaning. They are the essence of the law, which requires, respectively, subjective and volitional registration in the form of laws, decrees and other regulations. It is not the coercive force of law that creates equality, freedom, etc., but, on the contrary, the objective principle of equality is manifested (or not manifested) in one or another law. Before being formally enshrined, freedom and equality must be present in social reality objectively, as a social quality of reality itself, and not simply as the good wishes of legislators. Key words: law, equality
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